Informal Information Networks in Authoritarian Regimes:
Example of People's Republic of China
Those familiar with China appreciate the indirectness of communication of ideas and emotions that is inherent in Asian cultures. It should come as no surprise that the Chinese leadership sees the recent spate of films "about" China and Tibet as part of a coordinated strategy of political and diplomatic attack rather than entertainment coincidence.
Indirectness is not only a mode of communicating diplomatic information and attitudes, it is also a method of surviving in the worldıs largest authoritarian country. I offer these observations not to further theory or confirm a hypothesis, but rather to provide data for our consideration. Mass communication was part of my research agenda on a number of recent extended visits to the People;s Republic of China.
Let me give this powerful example of the nature of political communication. It appears that the stimulus for the Cultural Revolution was a play written by Wu Han, Deputy Mayor of Beijing, in 1961. The play, "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office," was about a wise and virtuous Ming official who, devoted to the welfare of the people, questioned the wisdom of the actions of an egotistical emperor. The emperor dismissed the official, Hai Rui. Mao Zedong was threatened by the parallel to his dismissal of General Peng Dehuai, a fellow survivor of the Long March, who dared question Maoıs conduct of the Great Leap Forward in a private letter. Mao, not wanting to acknowledge failure, extended the ill-fated policies several more years, resulting in famine and economic disaster.
Peng Dehuai was one of the survivors of the Long March to rise to prominence. He commanded the Chinese attack against the American forces at the Yalu River during the Korean conflict, resulting in the American retreat into South Korea. He served as Minister of Defense. Peng's challenge to Mao's handling of the Great Leap Forward resulted in swift purge, and he was labeled as the head of the "anti-Party group." In 1965 he was sent to work in the "third line" construction in Southwest China and died in 1974, near the end of the Cultural Revolution.
Mao attempted to challenge Wu Han's play by writing letters for publication in the party papers in Beijing. The Beijing party bosses backed the playwright and the Beijing papers refused to publish Mao's criticisms. To Mao, the party needed purification and the Cultural Revolution began its ten-year reign of terror in 1966.
Thirty years later Marshal Peng Dehuai was rehabilitated, as Deng was several times during his life. One of the most recent films produced by the Beijing Film Studios was "Peng Dehuai in the 'Third Line' Construction." The film, according to publicity, "is considered an ode to the devotion of communists." Peng's reputation has since been "rehabilitated," and "the film tells of his unique experience working [in Southwest China] and praises his profound love for the people."
One of the most powerful tools for identifying and condemning traitors to the state were the Big Character posters. It was such a poster that helped spark the Cultural Revolution. In May 1966, Nie Yuanzi put up a wall poster at Beijing University denouncing the university administration for restricting the Cultural Revolution and preventing it from developing. She argued for a vigorous mass movement. Mao had the poster reprinted in the Communist Party's national newspaper, People's Daily. In response, wall posters proliferated, outstripping available space. Courtyards, even rooms, had ropes strung across them like clotheslines from which posters hung.
The month of May is an auspicious month for Chinese communism and for Beijing University. The month begins with May Day, the international labor celebration. The Chinese Communist Party is often dated to a declaration made on the steps of Beijing (then Peking) University in May 1921. The Cultural Revolution is associated with the May 1966 Big Character poster. The student movement that resulted in Tien An Mien Square crisis rumbled out of the Beijing University campus in May 1989. The two month period leading to June 4 involves an increase in Public Security Bureau activity, including closing of the "BeiDa" campus. Foreign correspondents call it, "the silly season."
Symbols are important devices for communication. Located in the center of Tien An Mien Square is a obelisk, surrounded by security personnel and security devices, including remote controlled cameras. This spot was a rallying point for symbolic politics long before Lady Democracy was carried into the Square in 1989. The Cultural Revolution ground to a halt with the deaths of Mao and the popular premier Zhou En-Lai. Those who lived through the times remember Zhou as the man who saved China from itself, including personally assuring the protection of the Forbidden City and other cultural artifacts. Mourners flooded into the Square to lay wreaths at the obelisk in honor of Zhou. The notorious Gang of Four, including Maoıs widow, opposed Zhou and ordered the wreaths removed. This was too much for the public and the outcry emboldened the moderates to move against the Gang of Four, resulting in their arrest and imprisonment. Wreaths were tangible threat to power and their removal brought down a "clique."
The struggles of the Eighties between Deng's economic reformers and the conservative hard-liners played itself out on the Democracy Wall, upon which home-grown publishers posted the one copy of their newspapers. Democracy Wall-style publishing attracted a ready readership crossing socio-economic lines. Later, cracking down on dissent meant stripping the walls. While the famous Democracy Wall no longer functions, nor do the times allow such free expression, "wall publishing" is standard fare on university campuses. Unlike American universities where fliers and posters are ignored, Chinese students devour campus news posted on designated boards. Two of my favorites were the announcement of the Friday night American movie, "Everlasting Man Who Flies Like a Bat," and an invitation to a party sponsored by the youth branch of the Communist Party. I explained "Batman Forever" and the university administrator apologized that the campus Communist Party had become little more than a social club. This was hardly the stuff of student revolution.
An article in the China Daily, the Partyıs English language organ, revealed a curious situation under an odd rubric. The article, headlined "Healthy college environment a priority," discussed the results of a three-day conference on enhancing security in the countryıs colleges and universities. The lead paragraph reported that State Councilor Luo Gan "asked governments at all levels to ensure safety in schools and to create a healthy environment for college students." Luo said that a safe and healthy environment is as important as the quality of the education. The terminology appears to reflect that same concerns facing American college and university administrators, including problems of campus crime and student health issues.
Subsequent paragraphs in the story, however, suggested different concepts as the story reported that "this is the first time ministerial leaders have gathered to report on morality education and security conditions." The conference "was aimed at cracking down on crimes that encroach on the interests of teachers and students in colleges and universities, and to prevent possible serious cases in order to guarantee a more safe climate for students."
The conference also discussed the "Regulation on College Security Work," jointly issued by the State Education Commission (SEC) and the Ministry of Public Security. According to the article, "the regulation asks school authorities to reinforce management of campus cultural activities, entertainment and service activities, and to clean up pornographic audio-video products and electronic publications spreading in some schools." The regulations also regulate commercial activities by universities (such as renting of school buildings, opening of commercial activities, licensing of commercial vendors). Also, "no bars, dancing halls, video rooms, billiard centres or video game rooms are allowed to open near schools."
Democracy Wall-style communication and Big Character posters no longer exist. There is no obvious informal or non-governmental public communication in this manner. Among the official pronouncements that are posted are photographs of convicted criminals executed under the recent aggressive campaign against crime. Communication appears to be one-way, from the government (including the party) through an extensive and well-orchestrated network of media, including newspapers, magazines, books, radio, and television.
A fascinating short article in the China Daily revealed much about the media structure and role in China. The page two article, entitled "Media urged to brush up on morals," reported on a speech by a senior Communist Party official at a conference on the state of "professional morals." "The days of backhanders and free lunches may be over for Chinaıs journalists," the article opened. Xu Guangchun, deputy head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, "called for a new code of morals to stop the practice of reporters being paid by companies or organizations to cover specific stories." Xu was quoted as saying, "The media sector should be highly responsible to the party, the people and the cause of journalism, and should take it as a perennial task to fight 'paid news'." He was also quoted as saying, "Most of the staff in our media sector have regulated themselves strictly and have been honest in performing their duties." However, he added, according to the article, that the "incidences of 'paid news' have reappeared as corruption has infected the news media."
The conference, "has thrown the spotlight on the 'unhealthy trend' which has filtered through the industry. The conference was attended by officials of "25 major media organizations and provincial propaganda departments," including major newspaper and media organizations. The "officials...compared notes on promoting professional moral over the past three years." The story reaffirms the Partyıs supremacy in media matters, reveals the role of Party propaganda officials in directing the media, and reminds us that the media is to serve the society is a specific manner, which does not provide for its protection to act independently.
Three anecdotes illustrate the situation. First, reporters for the China Daily, when interviewed about the structure of the paper cannot explain the relationship of the paper to the government or the party. One reporter expressly asserted having no interest in the matter. A former China Daily reporter confirmed that the paper is ultimately responsible to the Party's Central Committee. Second, expecting to find the Womenıs Journalist Association to be an independent body, we found that it is housed in government offices, protected by the armed police. Finally, as evidence of the spread of free enterprise to the media sector, on one trip I found myself in the broadcast ministry's recording studios doing voice-overs for commercially-marketed English-language teaching videos.
Another article in the China Daily summarized the needed for "rules" for TV stations. The article cited reports in the Beijing Radio and TV News, and the Peopleıs Daily, was well as officials of the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television, including the chairperson of China Central Television, who serves as one of the vice-ministers. The article reported that "faced with the shortage of programmes and shrinking audiences, some TV stations choose to show obscene, pirated or politically incorrect programmes." Citing the People's Daily, the national Chinese language newspaper, the article reported, "In a nationwide crackdown in 1995, eight TV stations were fined, and had their operations suspended for airing pornographic, smuggled or politically problematic programmes..." The article concluded by editorializing, "It is obvious that TV stations still need State regulation."
Over the past few years, the government has limited the number of Western (mostly American) films to ten titles per year. Among the recent titles were "Bridges of Madison County," the Batman sequels, and "Blown Away," with Tommy Lee Jones as the IRA bomber in Boston. These and Arnold Schwarzenager films don't fit any ideological profile. The explanation may be economic, revealing the deep fear of losing culture, in this instance losing the domestic film industry. It is an industry that tends to get more recognition and acclaim outside of China than inside.
The Beijing Film Studios, which according to a Western source familiar with the studios, function as a type of "Potemkin village." The studios apparently exist to support the assertion that movies are made in Beijing. However, the leading Chinese filmmakers are kept at arms length from the capital city, in part because of the anti-government messages in their films. One person likened it to the situation at a state technical university, "They have a media department, but they have no equipment."
Communication technology has confounded the Chinese, as it has other authoritarian regimes. The 1989 uprising was noted for the use of fax machines. Dissidents keep in touch with the world via the fax. We remembered watching live as Dan Rather was ordered to "pull the plug" on his satellite uplink. The Chinese post, telephone and telegraph ministry could not afford to pull the plug on the telephone system. In effect, the Chinese were hamstrung by the very technology they needed. The Nineties version of the fax is the Internet. Over the last two years, the Chinese have struggled to balance the technological need for access to the Internet with the concerns for internal security and political stability. It was a rocky start, attempting to control the technology by limiting the nodes or access points.
All media are government controlled, published either by government agencies or party organizations. This allows coordination of political messages across the media and throughout the country. Chinese newspapers regularly cite each other, generally derived from reports from Xinhua, the national news agency. Foreign journalists who monitor the Chinese media are conscious of the pattern.
The foreign media are heavily monitored. One American journalist acknowledged that there is "intellectual handwringing" over issues of political freedom, though little action. In spite of the extensive media portrayal in the West, the dissident community is very small. There is political apathy, perhaps as a result of the heavy propaganda.
The major issue for Chinese press has been criticism of corruption, albeit low level corruption, or, as one Chinese economist told me, "the people that the government canıt protect." The Chinese press does provide information and insight. Gossip in the regional papers "reveals a very free market of public life," a CNN staffer told me. She told about a famous dancer who had a sex change operation to become a woman. Although openly gay, he is attracted to straight men. The feature stories are "really revealing about local conditions." One foreign correspondent likened reading the Chinese press to Cold-War Kremlinology, "China has made an intellectual exercise out of reading between the lines."
If all normal media channels are either controlled or restricted, and the traditional forms of communication, such as Big Character posters and Democracy Walls, are not operating, how do people communicate? It appears, in the words of one foreign diplomat, that there is a structure of "back alley news." People talk to each other. One person I interviewed said, "My idea is that most people sit around at work and talk, with nothing else to do." The technology that may be stimulating the transmission of back alley news is the proliferation of the telephone and the improvement in its quality. Perhaps the fastest growing segment of the telephone system is the cellular phone, since is does not require the extensive delay and bureaucratic paperwork for installation. On one trip, I traveled to Datong, a provincial city (not even a capital) northwest of Beijing, with the person supervising the installation of a new 30,000 cellular phone system. Once again, the technology needed to advance economically provides the challenge to political dominance.