John W. Williams, Political Science Department

Principia College, Elsah, Illinois 62028

618-374-5230; jww@prin.edu

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Portions of this paper were presented at the 1996 annual meeting of the Illinois Political Science Association and the 1996 annual meeting of the Midwest Association of Public Opinion Research.

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Political observers have voiced concern over the detrimental impact of negative campaigning, including negative advertising, on political participation (Colford, 1986; Garfield, 1990; Hinds, 1990; Martz, 1988; "Much Ado," 1985). Some political observers suggest that the effects of individual negative campaigns go beyond individual campaigns, contributing to apathy and cynicism toward the democratic system (Crotty and Jacobson, 1980; Dionne, 1991; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland, 1991). Political consultants, for example, tend to believe that negative advertising increases voter mistrust of politicians (Perloff and Kinsey, 1990). There is little question that voters dislike negative political advertising and find it unfair, uninformative, unethical, and deceptive (Garramone, 1984; Johnson and Copeland, 1987; Merritt, 1984; Pinkleton and Garramone, 1992; Steward, 1975; Surlin and Gordon, 1977; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland, 1991).

Negative advertising is premised on the goals of reducing the votersí favorable attitudes towards an opponent--the target--without damaging the candidate--the source. This study is based on the simple hypothesis that a negative campaign, in this specific instance involving direct mail literature, should influence votersí attitudes toward the respective candidates. The null hypothesis is that the negative direct mail campaign will not influence voters. The null hypothesis is that the means of favorability ratings of the two candidates before the negative direct mail campaign will be equal to the means of favorability ratings of the candidates after the campaign. The alternative hypothesis is that the campaign will influence voters, or that the means of favorability ratings after the campaign will be different that those before the campaign. The expectation, of course, is that the means of favorability ratings of the target will decline, while the means of favorability ratings of the source will rise.

A unique opportunity was offered during the Illinois general elections of November 1994 to examine the impact of negative campaigning of both the target and the source.

Jersey County is a rural county in southwestern Illinois at the confluence of the Mississippi and Illinois rivers. It is entirely within the 97th Illinois legislative district, of which the county has been a part of since the 1970 constitutional revision creating single member seats in the lower chamber of the Illinois General Assembly. The district has been represented consistently since 1970 by Republicans. The current incumbent is Thomas "Tom" Ryder. However, Jersey County has been a competitive or swing county, with its state senator, circuit judge, circuit clerk, county treasurer, stateís attorney, and senior members of the county board being Democrats. The county clerk and sheriff are Republicans. Two years earlier, a Republican defeated an incumbent Democrat for coroner. The number of people voting in primaries, a rough method for assessing party strength in Illinois (although party affiliation is not required to vote in primaries), has traditionally favored the Democratic Party in Jersey County, but it has never been a guarantee. For example, a very popular and beloved Republican county clerk has been in office over 30 years.

Although the Republican Party controlled statewide redistricting following the 1990 census, the boundaries of the 97th district were shifted southward into neighboring Madison County, renown as a solid Democratic stronghold. However, the portion of the county, primarily the township and village of Godfrey, added to the district is the lone pocket of Republican voting in the entire county.

Negative campaigns are rare in this region, perhaps because people know each other and the candidates. In 1992 a challenger nearly defeated an incumbent stateís attorney using a negative advertising campaign in the local newspaper. It is not clear if the strategy brought the challenger close to victory or contributed to his defeat. The challenger was an experienced, well-known attorney, and the incumbent, though already in office, was young and learned on the job. There is anecdotal evidence that dissatisfied voters changed their minds in the last weeks of the campaign and decided to stay with the incumbent. Several years later local politicians still share dismay over the strategy, as well as some of the incumbentís responses.

Tom Ryder has risen into the top levels of the Illinois Republican delegation in the General Assembly, making him a target for Democratic strategists. As noted, the 97th District could switch its allegiance. It has loyally supported its long time state senator, Vince Demuzio, a leader in the Illinois Democratic Party and former chairman of the partyís state central committee. The Democratic Party recruited Jerry Montague (pronounced Mon-tag), an elementary school principal from the heavily Repulican area of the district (potentially negating party loyalty) with family farm ties in the region. The party orchestrated the campaign from Springfield and funded the central campaign strategy, a hard-hitting multiple direct mail campaign to every household in the district. The direct mail pieces were negative on their face, accusing Ryder of being bought by special interests, of misusing taxpayer monies, of being guilty of irregularities in office, and of being more loyal to Chicago.

What was the impact of the negative direct mail advertising campaign on the election? Clearly, it is very difficult to assess the impact of one tactic on an over-all campaign, especially on a post hoc basis. Because the author was not privileged to the tactics of either campaign, it was not possible to prepare an appropriate pre-test/post-test scenario, even for a field experiment. The challengerís direct mail campaign was quickly in high gear.

Montague staged a massive multiple piece direct mail campaign to every voter household in the district. Each piece was either 8 1/2" x 11" or 11" x 17", folded in half. Each piece was on slick, clay-based stock, using at least one color in addition to black and white. There were eight principal pieces, identified by their key slogans:

Because the challenger did not reveal the nature of his campaign before implementing it, nor did he reveal the full extent of it, it was not possible to conduct a field experiment to test the effects of the direct mail campaign. Instead, this study is based on self-reported attitudes--before and after receiving the literature--of actual voters moments after they cast their votes in this election.

This study involved a short self-administered survey conducted on the day of the 1994 Illinois general election. Surveys were offered to every person who had just voted at three polling stations in Jersey County, Illinois. The results are based on respondent self-reporting.

The voting population of Jersey County is split between the county seat of Jerseyville and rural areas, including several tiny villages. Based on reviews of past voting patterns, three precincts were selected for exit polling. The precincts have a tradition over the last two decades of competitive voting. Over the past ten general elections, the voters in these three precincts were as likely to vote for members of either party in every county-wide race (22 races were examined). The Jersey County Election Authority confirmed this conclusion based on their own experience supervising voting over the past decades. Three polling places were selected -- one within the City of Jerseyville (Jersey 9, Illini Junior High School) and two in rural precincts (Elsah 2, Elsah Township Building; Mississippi 1, Mississippi Township Hall, McClusky).

With formal approval of the Jersey County Election Authority (the local authority charged by the State of Illinois to conduct elections), trained undergraduate pollsters were stationed at each of the three polling places from 7 am (one hour after opening of the polls) to 7 pm on Tuesday, November 8, 1994. They politely asked every person exiting the polling places to complete the one page questionnaire.

Precinct Number Voting Number Polled Percent of Voters

Elsah 2 337 175 51.19%

Jersey 9 223 103 46.19%

Mississippi 1 433 197 45.50%

Total 993 475 47.84%

The survey asked if the voters were "familiar with the direct mail advertising campaign of Jerry Montague, who is challenging, Tom Ryder, for State Representative?" and whether they remembered "receiving any of his literature?" The survey asked four parallel questions: "Before you received the literature, what was your opinion of Tom Ryder?", "...of Jerry Montague?", "After you received the literature, what was your opinion of Tom Ryder?", "...Jerry Montague?" The respondents answered by circling choices on a four-item Likert scale or a fifth option of "donít know." Among a brief series of demographic questions were several questions to explore partisanship and strength of party identification.

Within Jersey County, 7107 votes were cast for either Montague or Ryder for state representative. There were no other candidates. The remaining 153 ballots did not cast votes for state representative. In Jersey County, Tom Ryder beat Jerry Montague with 4170 votes (58.57%) to 2937 votes (41.33%). The following chart shows the voting by the three surveyed precincts:

Total Votes Vote Split for Two Candidates**

Cast* Tom Ryder (Rep) Jerry Montague (Dem)

Elsah 2 337 207 (63.11%) 121 (36.89%)

Jersey 9 223 142 (65.14%) 76 (34.68%)

Mississippi 1 433 239 (65.1%) 187 (43.9%)

Total: 993 588 (60.49%) 384 (39.41%)

* total includes votes cast for write-ins and non-votes on the office of state representative.

** excludes votes cast for write-ins and non-votes.

Illinois does not require party membership and has open primaries. As a result, it is very difficult to estimate the relative strength of the two political parties in the electorate. The general measure of relative party alignment in Illinois has been the vote for the Trustees of the University of Illinois. Because the candidates for Trustees are unknowns, the key predictor of their election is assumed to be party identification. Three Trustees are elected every two years, and each party puts forward a full slate. In Jersey County, in 1994, the top Republican candidate received 3204 votes (14.74% of the total vote for Trustees) while the top Democratic candidate received 3179 votes (14.63%). This nearly even split reinforces the assumption that Jersey County is a split or swing county, with a roughly balanced party alignment.

The strength of partisanship, at least in Jersey County in 1994, can be measured by the number of straight ticket votes versus the number of split ticket votes. Of the 7,260 ballots cast, 830 (11.43%) were straight ticket Republicans, 526 (7.25%) were straight ticket Democrats, 1 (.01%) straight ticket Libertarian, and 5903 (81.31%) split tickets. Jersey County voters do not appear to be committed to party-line voting. Of the less that 20% who vote party-line, the Republicans appear more committed to party than do Democrats.

The strength of partisanship question allowed for the respondents to be examined in three different ways. First, they were examined by the six categories of strength of partisanship; second, they were examined by identification with party (Democratic, Republican, independent); third, they were examined by partisan leaning (Democrat versus Republican). The respondents grouped into nearly equal categories. As the table indicates, strong Democrats, strong Republicans, independents leaning Democratic, and independents leaning Republican appeared in similar numbers. Likewise, Democrats and Republicans appeared in similar numbers. Finally, total partisan leaning toward Democratic or Republican parties was nearly equal.

Strong Democrat 20.9% Democrat 29.1% Democrat 50.7%

Weak Democrat 8.2% (with leaning indep.)

Indep (leaning Demo) 21.6% Independent 42.5%

Indep (leaning Repub) 20.9%

Weak Republican 6.6% Republican 28.4% Republican 49.3%

Strong Republican 21.8% (with leaning indep.)

There was a partisan relationship in the voting, with strength of partisanship directly related to vote (chi-square 78.55, df=5, p<.00000). Clearly, the more committed one is to their party, the more committed one is to their partyís candidate. Jersey County is no exception.

Jerry Montague Tom Ryder

(Democrat) (Republican) Total

Democrats/independents 94 77 171

leaning Democratic 27.2% 22.3% 49.6%

Republicans/independents 21 153 174

leaning Republican 6.1% 44.3% 50.4%

Total 115 230 345

33.3% 66.7% 100%

Although there was party-line voting, large numbers of self-identified Democrats voted for Ryder, the Republican incumbent, while relatively few self-identified Republicans voted for the Democratic challenger, Montague. The following table compares the percentage vote for Democrat Montague versus Republican Ryder in each of the categories of strength of partisanship, party identification, and partisan leaning. In each measure, Republicans (and independents) were more loyal to their candidate than were Democrats to their own candidate. Given the relatively equal numbers of respondents in each category, it is clear that Tom Ryder benefited from a strong cross-over support from Democrats and independent-leaning Democratic.

Category\Vote: Dem v Rep Dem v Rep Demo v Rep

Strong Democrat 62.5 v 37.5% Demo 61.2 v 38.8% Demo 55.0 v 45.0%

Weak Democrat 58.1 v 41.9% (with leaning indep.)

Indep (leaning Demo) 45.6 v 54.4% Indep 30.3 v 69.7%

Indep (leaning Repub) 16.9 v 83.1%

Weak Republican 16.7 v 83.3% Repub 8.2 v 91.8% Repub 12.1 v 87.9%

Strong Republican 5.5 v 94.5% (with leaning indep.)

A. Were you familiar with the direct mail advertising campaign of Jerry Montague?

yes 343 73.8%

no 122 26.2%

B. Do you remember receiving any of his literature?

yes 337 72.5%

no 128 27.5%

C. Did the literature influence your vote?

not at all 62.4%

a little bit 12.0%

some 16.3%

quite a bit 4.8%

very much 4.2%

Tom Ryder had a higher pre-literature rating that did Jerry Montague. Since "very favorable" was coded one and "very unfavorable" was coded five, a lower mean represents a higher favorability rating. Both candidates received a decline in favorability, although Tom Ryderís post-literature favorability rating was still higher than Jerry Montagueís. Ryderís post-literature rating was still higher than Montagueís pre-literature rating. Furthermore, Ryderís decline in mean rating was a third of the amount by which Montagueís mean rating declined.

Jerry Montague Tom Ryder

Pre-literature opinion mean 2.176* mean 2.045

n 204 n 396

std .774 std .879

Post-literature opinion mean 2.329 mean 2.096

n 289 n 375

std .878 std .887

change in mean .153 .051

* the higher the mean, the less favorable the response

T-tests for paired samples showed a negative shift for Montague of .0957 at t-value of 1.91 and p=.058 (188 pairs) and a negative shift for Ryder of .0534 at t-value of 2.30 and p=.022 (356 pairs). The difference in higher mean shift but lower t-value for Montague and lower mean shift but higher t-value for Ryder is affected by the number of pairs, with Ryder having almost twice the number of pairs.

Although 475 people responded to the exit poll, many did not answer all of the questions. The response rate varied depending on the candidate and the pre- or post- nature of the literature question. As a result, using a T-test for paired samples reduced the useable sample.

Based on two independent sample t-tests, the campaign literature had a greater impact on Democratic voters than Republican voters (T-value=3.27, p=.001, mean difference=.3724) and on Montague voters than on Ryder voters (T-value=5.54, p<.000, mean difference=.6876).

A series of t-test for independent samples revealed significant means differences in pre- and post-literature opinions of both candidates based on the voting behavior and party affiliation of the respondents.

Voted for Montague Voted for Ryder T-value; 2-Tail

Signif.; Mean

Difference

Pre-opinion of Montague n=83, mean=1.7470 n=82, mean=2.6098 -8.38, .000

-.8628

Post-opinion of Montague n=113, mean=1.7257 n=134, mean=2.8060 -12.01, .000

-1.0803

Pre-opinion of Ryder n=105, mean=2.9143 n=223, mean=1.6188 16.31, .000

1.2955

Post-opinion of Ryder n=102, mean=3.0490 n=216, mean=1.6389 18.26, .000

1.4101

Note that the pre-post means for Montague decreased (improved) by .0213 for Montague voters and increased (deteriorated) by .1962 for Ryder voters. The pre-post means for Ryder decreased (deteriorated) by .1347 for Montague voters and by .0201 for Ryder voters. Apparently, the literature improved the feeling slightly toward Montague among his own voters, yet hurt him among Ryder voters. The literature hurt Ryder among Montague voters and slightly among his own voters. Even though the voters felt less inclined toward Ryder, they still voted for him, returning him to office. Thus, the literature appears to have had some impact, the impact was insufficient to affect the outcome of the election.

Democrat Republican T-value; 2-Tail

or leaning or leaning Signif.; Mean

Difference

Pre-opinion of Montague n=103, mean=1.8932 n=76, mean=2.5789 -6.57, .000

-.6857

Post-opinion of Montague n=147, mean=2.0612 n=109, mean=2.7523 -6.83, .000

-.6911

Pre-opinion of Ryder n=176, mean=2.3125 n=181, mean=1.7569 6.37, .000

.5556

Post-opinion of Ryder n=170, mean=2.3647 n=166, mean=1.8133 5.98, .000

.5515

Note that the pre-post means for both Montague and Ryder increased (deteriorated) for voters of both parties. The mean score of feelings of Democrats of both candidates (Montague=.1680; Ryder=.1734) dropped more than did the feelings of the Republicans for both candidates (Montague=.0522, Ryder=.0564). Apparently, the literature made a greater impact on Democratic voters than on Republican voters. However, it hurt the Democratic candidate as well as his intended target. This implies that the direct mail campaign may have been as damaging to the challenger as to the incumbent.

There was a partisan relationship in influence of the campaign literature, with Democrats more likely to be influenced by the literature (based on strength of partisanship: chi-square 39.70, df=20, p=.00545; based on identification with party: chi-square 15.57, df=9, p=.04996; based on partisan leaning: chi-square 26.67, df=4, p=.00002). The stronger one identified as a Democrat, the stronger one claimed the influence of the literature. This makes sense in that the literature was issued by the state Democratic party in support of their candidate attacking the Republican opponent in a highly partisan race. There was no relationship between strength of partisanship and influence of campaign literature, controlling for voting.

There was a partisan relationship in pre-literature opinions of both candidates. The stronger Republicans had a higher rating of Ryder (chi-square 65.93, df=15, p<.00000), while the stronger Democrats had a higher rating of Montague (chi-square 64.88, df=15, p<.00000). Likewise, there was a partisan relationship in post-literature opinions of both candidates. The stronger Republicans had a higher rating of Ryder (chi-square 55.20, df=15, p<.00000), while the stronger Democrats had a higher rating of Montague (chi-square 72.26, df=15, p<.00000). There were similar patterns in the examination by party identification and partisan leaning. Generally, the chi-square decreased with Ryder from pre- to post-literature, while the chi-square for Montague increased.

Strength of Partisanship (df=15)

(chi-square, significance) Jerry Montague Tom Ryder

Pre-Literature 64.88 65.93

.00000 .00000

Post-Literature 72.26 55.20

.00000 .00000

Party Identification (df=6)

(chi-square, significance) Jerry Montague Tom Ryder

Pre-Literature 41.32 39.37

.00000 .00000

Post-Literature 44.23 33.25

.00000 .00001

Partisan Leaning (df=3)

(chi-square, significance) Jerry Montague Tom Ryder

Pre-Literature 46.01 38.96

.00000 .00000

Post-Literature 43.68 33.29

.00000 .00000

Each of these twelve cross-breaks (pre- and post-literature for Montague and Ryder, for each of the three examinations of partisanship) was reexamined controlling for the respondentsí voting, thereby creating 24 cross-breaks. There were no significant patterns in the 12 cross-breaks related to opinions about Tom Ryder, either pre- or post-literature, regardless of how the respondents voted. Likewise, there were no significant patterns in the six cross-breaks related to pre- or post-literature opinions about Jerry Montague by those who voted for him. However, there were significant patterns in all six cross-breaks concerning Montague by voters who voted for his opponent. In all three pre/post situations, the chi-squares declined and the p values, though still significant, rose. Even though Democrats voted for Ryder, they tended to think more favorably of Montague than did Republicans. Their favorable feelings, however, declined slightly after the literature campaign.

There was an inverse relationship between pre-literature opinions of Ryder and Montague (chi-square 56.98, df=9, p<.00000) and post-literature opinions of Ryder and Montague (chi-square 112.79, df=9, p<.00000). Clearly, the difference in the relationship widened with the literature.

A one-way analysis of variance was calculated for the four groups--pre-Montague, post-Montague, pre-Ryder, and post-Ryder, and for the two sets of pairs--pre- and post-Montague, and pre- and post-Ryder. The null hypothesis holds that the four means are equal. The null hypothesis holds that there is no difference between the favorability ratings between candidates or their pre- and post- favorability ratings.

Analysis of Variance

Favorability by Rating Group

Source D.F. Sum of Mean F F

Squares Squares Ratio Probability

Between Groups 3 15.1346 5.04487 6.7402 p<.01

Within Groups 1260 943.0718 0.74847

Total 1263

Favorability by Pre/Post Montague

Source D.F. Sum of Mean F F

Squares Squares Ratio Probability

Between Groups 1 8.1511 8.1511 11.6470 p<.01

Within Groups 491 343.6270 0.6999

Total 492

Favorability by Pre/Post Ryder

Source D.F. Sum of Mean F F

Squares Squares Ratio Probability

Between Groups 1 6.9835 6.9835 8.959 p<.01

Within Groups 769 599.4448 0.7795

Total 770

Because the F values are higher than the F distributions for alpha level of .01 for the respective degrees of freedom, each of the null hypotheses are rejected. There is a difference in the pre- and post- favorability ratings for both candidates. Assuming that the direct mail literature was the causal variable, the negative literature caused a decrease in voter feelings toward both candidates. As both the difference in means and the F ratios indicate, the decline was greater for the source of the literature than for the target of the literature. In effect, the negative campaign hurts the person using the tactic, rather than the intended target.

It appears that Democrats who were already committed to the candidate, Jerry Montague, were impressed by the literature, with their feelings toward Montague improving and their feelings toward Ryder declining. However, those Democrats, though committed to the party, who were not committed to the candidate reacted unfavorably to the literature. While the literature might have reduced their feelings toward the Republican, it also reduced their feelings toward the Democrat.

There is a cliché in politics that you identify your supporters, your detractors, and those on the fence. You aggressively pursue those on the fence, because your supporters are already committed and your detractors will not change their position. It is clear that the number of those on the fence is growing, as party loyalty declines and more Americans consider themselves independent. Voting studies indicate that a growing number of independents tend to vote Republican.

Tip OíNeill argued that "all politics are local." Campaigns have become more candidate centered, rather than party centered, and legislators develop "homestyles" to protect their incumbency. These trends indicate that it is the candidate, rather than the party, who appears to attract attention and support.

The Montague direct mail campaign against Tom Ryder did not succeed, in spite of its extent and expense. Ryder chose to ignore the campaign and fashioned his campaign as the incumbent state representative. The direct mail campaign, in attacking Ryder, may have solidify both Montagueís and Ryderís core support. Given the old cliché, these were unnecessary targets. There are indications that the campaign did not increase support for Montague among "weak" Democrats or independents leaning Democratic, two groups he needed for a victory. There are indications that the campaign actually decreased the level of support for him among those "on the fence"-- weak Democrats, independents (regardless of leaning), and weak Republicans. In effect, the campaign may have backfired. This may have resulted, in part, because the target "refused to take the bait," and Ryder did not respond in kind. As result, there were two campaigns, each occurring on a different level.

In my brief experience as a campaign advisor, I have strongly advised against "negative campaigning." One of my reasons is that in order to attack someone, you must acknowledge them. If nothing else, negative advertising contributes to name recognition. Montagueís campaign promoted the name and activities of Tom Ryder, while Ryderís campaign never acknowledge the presence of an opponent.

Another reason against negative advertising is that, from a resource standpoint, every attack on Ryder drained resources from building Montague as a candidate. Seven of the eight direct mail pieces either gave little space to the candidate (often as little as 25% of space) or defined the candidate in terms of his opponent. This position is reinforced by a set of independent sample t-test comparing the mean scores of opinions of pre- and post-literature positions of both candidates by whether respondents remembered the direct mail campaign. There was no statistical difference between those who remembered versus those who did not remember the campaign in their attitudes toward Montague. Recipients of the direct mail were no more supportive of Montague than those not receiving the literature. The direct mail did not help Montague. On the other hand, there were statistically significant differences in feelings toward Ryder between recipients and those who did not remember the direct mail literature, both before and after the campaign (pre-literature t-value=1.97, p=.049, mean difference=.2042; post-literature t-value=3.03, p=.003, mean difference=.3463). The increase in mean difference came from an increase (deterioration in favorability) in mean score of those who remembered the literature (from 2.0990 to 2.1706) and a decrease (improvement in favorability) in the mean score of those who did not remember (from 1.8947 to 1.8243). The literature might have hurt Ryder.

This leads to a third reason for opposing negative advertising. It can depend on the opponent to set the agenda. Only one of the nine direct mail pieces, arriving late in the campaign, devoted 100% of the piece to the challenger and his positive qualifications.

Does negative literature have an effect? Yes. But, what is the nature of the effect? This is the unknown.

In this election the negative literature appeared to harm the source of the literature more than the intended target. We can only speculate about the reason for this effect. Does negative campaigning not work in local elections, particularly where there is little pluralistic ignorance or third-person effect? Does negative campaigning not work in local elections, particularly where voters know or can meet the candidates face-to-face, have access to alternative sources of valued information and opinion, or are able to make their own informed assessments of candidates? Does negative campaigning not work in elections where the certain factors exists, such as relative popularity of the target, the near-total obscurity of the source, or the incongruity between voter perceptions and negative message? Is there something we can learn about local elections that can be applied to state or national elections in order to reduce the attractiveness of negative campaigns, thereby reducing the feelings of apathy, lack of efficacy, and sheer disgusted in voters?

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